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Abstract: In Hume’s epistemology, induction leads to discovery in matters of fact. However, because of 
the poor data Hume analyzes the balance of trade with a thought experiment, doing what Mill makes 
explicit afterwards: reason from assumptions, to reach conclusions which are true in the abstract. Hume’s 
potential explanation, what Peirce later calls abduction, is backed by a case study, the price revolution of 
the 16
th century, which supports half his abductive inference, when money supply is multiplied fivefold. 
Given that economics reasons abductively, Hume’s attention to realistic hypotheses and the adjustment 
process matters. 
Resumen: En la epistemología de Hume, la inducción lleva al descubrimiento en cuestiones fácticas. Sin 
embargo, los pobres datos llevan a Hume a analizar el balance comercial con un experimento mental; como 
Mill explicita después, razona desde supuestos para alcanzar conclusiones  verdaderas en abstracto.  La 
explicación potencial de Hume, que Peirce después llama abducción, está respaldada por un estudio de 
caso, la revolución de precios del siglo XVI, cuando la oferta monetaria se expande. Dado que la economía 
razona abductivamente, la atención de Hume a hipótesis realistas y al proceso de ajuste importan. 
JEL codes: B1, B4, E4, E5, F1 
Keywords: abduction, case studies, realistic assumptions, Hume, Mill, Peirce, Hayek, Akerlof 
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I. Introduction 
 
In An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, first published in 1748, David Hume 
establishes a contrast between “relations of ideas” and “matters of fact”. Relations of 
ideas can be discovered by reasoning, but matters of fact can only be discovered by 
experience. This leads to a strict divide between deductive  and inductive methods in 
formal and empirical sciences.
1 On the other hand, in his essay “On the balance of trade”, 
published  in  1752  as  part  of  the  Political  Discourses,  Hume  resorts  to  a  “general 
argument” because of the poor data. Though this procedure  contradicts his theory of 
discovery in empirical sciences through induction, it fits in nicely with what Mill (1836) 
describes  as  the  only  method  of  discovery  possible  in  social  sciences  due  to  the 
impossibility of experimentation, namely, that of reasoning from assumed hypothesis. 
The  observed  facts  that  motivate  Hume’s  general  argument,  in  order  to  show  the 
prevailing views are unfounded, are, foremost, that no country was being drained of its 
gold and silver, something surprising given the existing fears about a natural tendency of 
an excess of imports over exports if the government did not intervene. This can be seen 
as  an  instance  of  what  Peirce  (1903)  calls  “abduction”,  which  is  another  name  for 
guessing or forming hunches: “The surprising fact, C, is observed; but if A were true, C 
would be a matter of course. Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.” 
2 In this 
                                                 
1 Induction refers to arguments from a random sample to the population (a probable inference), as opposed 
to deduction, an argument from the population to a random sample (a necessary inference). 
2 In his early writings, Peirce adds abduction as a third form of argument, besides deduction and induction 
as defined in footnote 1. In his later writings, they become successive phases of inquiry (see, e.g., Peirce 
1908). The role of each mode of inference in inquiry is that abduction generates possible hypotheses to 
account  for  a  surprising  phenomenon,  deduction  clarifies  the  necessary  predictive  consequences,  and 
induction tests the predictions against the data: in Peirce’s words, in the Lectures on Pragmatism delivered 
at Harvard in 1903, “Deduction proves that something must be; Induction shows that something actually is 
operative;  Abduction  merely  suggests  that  something  may  be.”  Santaella  (2004)  briefly  discusses  the   3 
regard, Friedman (1953) closes his article on positive economics by saying that progress 
requires not only the testing and elaboration of existing hypotheses, but the construction 
of new ones, “a creative act of inspiration, intuition, invention; its essence is the vision of 
something new in familiar material”, a process which can be promoted by maxim and 
example. This describes abduction at its best, and applies to Hume’s contribution: the 
combination of old materials to explain new facts, introducing the quantity theory of 
money to the debate on the balance of trade in the mercantilist literature.
3 
Hume mentions the price revolution of the 16
th century for illustrative purposes, but it 
acts  as  supporting  evidence:  all  the  lines  of  his  general  argument,  the  specie-flow 
mechanism, are at work there (the quantity theory of money had also been inspired by the 
16
th century price revolution, see Munro 2007). Among all the potential explanations one 
could imagine, this episode where there is a sudden increase in the quantity of money 
lends plausibility to his abductive inference. 
The  next  section  presents  passages  from  Hume’s  texts  on  epistemology  and 
economics. Section III identifies the hypotheses in his general argument, and Section IV 
develops their methodological implications. Section V presents the conclusions. 
 
II. Comparing Hume’s texts 
 
A. Discovery in empirical sciences 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
evolution of Peirce’s thoughts on these three types of reasoning. Cf. also entries on Charles S. Peirce in the 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce/#dia, and in Wikipedia, at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_Sanders_Peirce. 
3 Wennerlind (2008) analyzes the precursors to Hume’s specie-flow mechanism. Paganelli (2006) places 
Hume’s theory of an endogenous money supply that adapts to demand within pre-modern monetary views.   4 
In the first part of Section IV of An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume 
(1748) establishes a strict distinction between “relations of ideas”, like the Pythagorean 
theorem, and “matters of fact”. For Hume, while relations of ideas can be discovered by 
reasoning, matters of fact can only be discovered by experience of “relations of cause and 
effect”: 
“I  shall  venture  to  affirm,  as  a  general  proposition,  which  admits  of  no 
exception, that the knowledge of this relation [of cause and effect] is not, in 
any  instance,  attained  by  reasonings  a  priori;  but  arises  entirely  from 
experience, when we find, that any particular objects are constantly conjoined 
with each other.” 
The illustrations on relations of cause and effect are drawn from natural philosophy, 
i.e., physics. Without prior experience, man “could not have inferred from the fluidity 
and transparency of water, that it would suffocate him, or from the light and warmth of 
fire, that it would consume him”. The same holds for the movement of a billiard-ball that 
hits a second ball. As Hume puts it, 
“Nor is geometry, when taken into the assistance of natural philosophy, ever 
able to remedy this defect, or lead us into the knowledge of ultimate causes by 
all that accuracy of reasoning, for which it is so justly celebrated. Every part of 
mixed  mathematics  proceeds  upon  the  supposition  that  certain  laws  are 
established by nature in her operations; and abstract reasonings are employed, 
either to assist experience in the discovery of these laws, or to determine their 
influence in particular instances ... but still, the discovery of the law itself is   5 
owing merely to experience, and all the abstract reasoning in the world would 
never lead us one step towards the knowledge of it.” 
Unlike  mathematical  relations,  these  empirical  relations  of  cause  and  effect  are 
contingent: “That the sun will not rise to-morrow is no less intelligible a proposition, and 
implies no more contradiction, than the affirmation, that it will rise.” 
4  
For  Hume,  experimentation  includes  plain  observation.
5  Hume  emphasizes  in  the 
second part of Section IV the need of repeated experimentation, because “It is only after a 
long  course  of  uniform  experiments  in  any  kind,  that  we  attain  a  firm  reliance  and 
security with regard to a particular event. Now where is that process of reasoning, which, 
from  one  instance,  draws  a  conclusion,  so  different  from  that  which  it  infers  from  a 
hundred  instances,  that  are  nowise  different  from  that  single  one?  ...I  cannot  find,  I 
cannot imagine any such reasoning.” In other words, abductive inference from a single 
case is impossible. 
He goes on to say that “nature has kept us at a great distance from all her secrets”, so 
that, at best, experience leads to fallible knowledge: “all our experimental conclusions 
proceed upon the supposition, that the future will be conformable to the past”, but “it is 
impossible, therefore, that any arguments from experience can prove this resemblance of 
the past to the future; since all these arguments are founded on the supposition of that 
resemblance.” 
                                                 
4  Newtonian  physics  views  the  movement  of  the  planets  around  the  sun  as  necessary.  I  discuss  how 
necessity applies within the confines of mathematical models in Section IV. 
5 Rotwein (1957), p. xxvii, points out how, in the Introduction of his 1739 A Treatise on Human Nature, 
Hume considers that controlled experiments are impracticable in moral philosophy. Hume goes on to say, 
“We must therefore glean up our experiments in this science from a cautious observation of human life, and 
take them as they appear in the common course of the world”.   6 
Despite this philosophical scepticism, “it is certain that the most ignorant and stupid 
peasants,  nay  infants,  nay  even  brute  beasts,  improve  by  experience,  and  learn  the 
qualities  of  natural  objects,  by  observing  the  effects  which  result  from  them”.  Hume 
points out in the following section that what is at play is not reason, but rather custom and 
habit, which leads us to expect similar cause-effect relationships to those experienced in 
the past. 
 
B. Hume’s approach in practice 
 
Hume addresses the prevailing fears of his contemporaries with regard to an unfavorable 
balance of trade that could drain a country of its gold and silver in his essay “Of the 
balance of trade”. Since the data on the balance of trade are very incomplete and allow to 
support  all  kinds  of  theories,  Hume  (1752)  turns  instead  to  a  celebrated  argument 
contained in four short paragraphs that are often quoted: 
   “In short, this apprehension of the wrong balance of trade, appears of such a 
nature, that it discovers itself, wherever one is out of humour with the ministry, 
or is in low spirits; and as it can never be refuted by a particular detail of all the 
exports, which counterbalance the imports, it may here be proper to form a 
general argument, that may prove the impossibility of this event, as long as we 
preserve our people and our industry. 
   Suppose four-fifths of all the money in Britain to be annihilated in one night, 
...  what  would  be  the  consequence?  Must  not  the  price  of  all  labour  and 
commodities sink in proportion, and every thing be sold as cheap as they were   7 
in those [past] ages? What nation could then dispute with us in any foreign 
market, or pretend to navigate or to sell manufactures at the same price, which 
to us would afford sufficient profit? In how little time, therefore, must this 
bring back the money which we had lost, and raise us to the level of all the 
neighbouring nations? Where, after we have arrived, we immediately lose the 
advantage of the cheapness of labour and commodities; and the farther flowing 
in of money is stopped by our fulness and repletion. 
   Again, suppose, that all the money of Britain were multiplied fivefold in a 
night,  must  not  the  contrary  effect  follow?  Must  not  all  labour  and 
commodities rise to such an exorbitant height, that no neighbouring nations 
could  afford  to  buy  from  us;  while  their  commodities,  on  the  other  hand, 
became comparatively so cheap, that, in spite of all the laws which could be 
formed, they would be run in upon us, and our money flow out; till we fall to a 
level with foreigners, and lose that great superiority of riches, which had laid 
us under such disadvantages? 
   Now,  it  is  evident,  that  the  same  causes,  which  would  correct  these 
exorbitant inequalities, were they to happen miraculously, must prevent their 
happening  in  the  common  course  of  nature,  and  must  for  ever,  in  all 
neighbouring  nations,  preserve  money  nearly  proportionable  to  the  art  and 
industry of each nation.” 
 
III. The hypotheses behind Hume’s general argument 
   8 
Hume’s (1752) general argument appears in the texts on history of economic thought 
under  the  heading  of  the  specie-flow  mechanism.  Though  Hume  considers  that  the 
prevailing  views  are  dead  wrong,  his  argument  actually  implies  they  are  incomplete. 
Hume’s insight is to combine the quantity theory of money with two hypotheses already 
found in mercantilist writings, in order to derive the workings of the whole system. 
The  first  hypothesis  is  clearly  articulated  by  Mun  in  his  1664  work,  England's 
Treasure By Forraign Trade, or The Ballance of our Forraign Trade is the Rule of our 
Treasure, often taken as a definition of mercantilism: 
 
(i) A positive balance of trade (i.e., more exports than imports) increases the quantity of 
money, a negative balance of trade diminishes it. 
 
With no international capital movements, this first hypothesis basically boils down to an 
accounting identity.
6 Hume makes this part of a mechanism where monetary imbalances 
are  corrected  through  trade,  which  is  a  forerunner  of  the  monetary  approach  to  the 
balance  of  payments  developed  by  Mundell  (1963)  where  monetary  imbalances  are 
corrected by capital movements. 
The second hypothesis is about how price competitiveness leads to a trade surplus, 
which is consistent with the prevailing views about the importance of stimulating exports, 
particularly in the mercantilist literature on the convenience of cheap labor (cf. Rotwein 
1957, p. xv): 
 
                                                 
6 Indeed, for Ricardo (1817), chapter VII, the distinctive characteristic of the theory of foreign trade is the 
lack of labor and capital mobility among countries.   9 
(ii) Buyers purchase goods where they are cheapest. 
 
This is a principle of arbitrage among goods, where all goods are treated as tradable. The 
equilibrium counterpart of this proposition is the law of one price.
7 
Hume combines these two hypotheses with the quantity theory of money. This third 
hypothesis, as first formulated by Martín de Azpilcueta in 1556, and Jean Bodin in 1568, 
was that the influx of silver from the Americas led to a decrease of the purchasing power 
of money (cf. Munro 2007).
8 Hume’s formulation is that: 
 
(iii) The stock of money is proportional to the trade, industry and people of each nation. 
 
Here money demand responds to the transactions motive. Given that the real amount of 
transactions and the velocity of circulation are implicitly treated as exogenous, Hume in 
effect follows Azpilcueta and Bodin in assuming that changes in the money supply lead 
to changes in prices, assuming even more stringently that prices change in proportion to 
money. This is a special case of Berdell’s (1995) second equation, where prices react to 
differences between money supply and demand, when price adjustment is instantaneous. 
In the Appendix, the three assumptions are put together in mathematical terms. They 
lead to derive the conclusions that, in the long run, the law of one price holds, and the 
                                                 
7 For Cesarano (1998), the law of one price also holds in the short run. However, the standard interpretation 
is backed by the paragraph that immediately follows the general argument, where Hume says prices were 
ten times higher in Spain than in France because of the inflow of American silver in the 16
th century. What 
holds is that money supply always equals money demand (see Appendix). 
8  At  the  time,  the  stock  of  money  was  constituted  by  gold  and  silver.  Munro  (2007)  mentions  that 
negotiable credit instruments, which functioned as paper money, were just starting to emerge.   10 
money stock ends up distributed among countries in proportion to the real volume of 
transactions. 
 
IV. A methodological analysis of Hume’s general argument 
 
A. The necessary character of Hume’s conclusions 
 
To settle the debate on the balance of trade, Hume (1752) does not center his general 
argument  on  empirical  regularities,  but  rather  on  a  thought  experiment.  He  derives  a 
strong conclusion: “the same causes ... must for ever [italics added], in all neighbouring 
nations, preserve money nearly proportionable to the art and industry of each nation”. 
Hume is in fact formulating what he describes in Hume (1748) as relations of ideas. 
Within the bounds of his hypotheses, Hume is absolutely correct, because his conclusions 
can be derived by deduction, just like the Pythagorean theorem. When Hume confidently 
asserts that the same causes always produce the same effects, these necessary relations 
apply  to  the  hypothetical  model  he  constructed,  not  to  a  set  of  contingent  empirical 
regularities.
 
Schabas (2008), pp. 167-168, points out that Hume seeks to isolate certain tendencies 
in the hypothetical world of his monetary thought experiments, but he is aware that other 
factors are at work in the actual world. As in Hume’s general argument, for Mill (1836) 
the  conclusions  of  economic  reasoning  are  completely  valid  only  in  the  abstract. 
Conclusions  are  true  in  the  concrete  once  proper  allowances  are  made  for  disturbing   11 
causes that may have been overlooked, so the empirical validity of a theory has to be 
ascertained in each particular instance.
9 
Perhaps, Hume’s assertions are intended to be a bit stronger. For example, Hume’s 
second hypothesis about arbitrage is an instance of a much more general hypothesis in 
relation to commerce formulated in Hume’s (1742) essay “Of the rise and progress of the 
arts and sciences”, namely, that “Avarice, or the desire for gain, is an universal passion, 
which operates at all times, in all places, and upon all persons”. Hume treats self-interest 
as a determinate cause because it operates regularly on a great number, in contrast to 
passions like love of knowledge, which are subject to private whim and operate on few 
persons.  
Though  Mill  (1836)  says  the  definition  of  a  man  in  economics,  as  someone  who 
desires to possess wealth, is arbitrary, just as the definition of a line in geometry as 
something with length but without breadth, he nonetheless shares Hume’s confidence in 
its empirical validity. Mill’s justification is introspection. This is not at odds with Hume, 
given that, starting with Descartes, modern philosophy takes human consciousness as the 
only thing we can be certain about (Kenny 2006, chapter 4). Dow (2009) recognizes that 
introspection  provides  a  distinctive  source  of  evidence  for  Hume,  but  because  of 
imperfect recall Hume regards historical knowledge, and third party observation, as more 
reliable. 
Mill (1836) derives a startling conclusion from the classical definition of economics: 
political economy is an abstract science like geometry, whose method is to reason from 
                                                 
9 Even the Pythagorean theorem depends for its applicability on whether the world is Euclidean or not.   12 
assumptions, not from facts.
10 As to the method a posteriori, of induction or inference 
based on direct evidence, for Mill it is not possible in economics and moral sciences due 
to the impossibility of experimentation and crucial experiments. 
Hausman (1994), pp. 38-40, notes that Mill’s views were influential, before Friedman 
(1953) became the most influential work on economic methodology. Keynes (1938), for 
example, echoes Mill’s views when he says that while economics is a science of thinking 
in  terms  of  models,  a  good  economist  needs  the  gift  of  vigilant  observation,  which 
requires  intimate  and  messy  acquaintance  with  the  facts,  since  the  material  to  which 
models are applied is not homogeneous through time. 
 
B. The surprising facts that prompt Hume’s abductive inference 
  
What motivates Hume’s essay is that, despite the continual worries, neither England, nor 
Ireland, nor any other country, is being drained of its gold and silver. To explain these 
facts that are surprising in the face of the existing beliefs and expectations, Hume builds a 
general argument that fits the mold of Peirce’s abductive inference. 
Abduction is a potential explanation: if what is being posited is true, the existing facts 
can  be  explained.  This  is  quite  different  from  the  deductive-nomological  model  of 
scientific explanation posited by Hempel, Hospers, and Popper, where the predictions are 
deductively derived from known facts and laws (Klimovsky 1994, chapter 15). By its 
nature, a shortcoming of abduction is that other arguments may also explain the same 
facts. Since this was not an era of free trade, a simple mercantilist counterargument to 
                                                 
10 Mill (1836) calls this method ‘a priori’, not in reference to pure deduction, as is usual, but rather to a 
broader process that involves both experience and reasoning, a mixed method of induction and deduction.   13 
Hume could be that existing state of affairs was precisely due to the prevailing restraints 
on imports. Like the case of overprotective parents, who don’t let their kid ride a bike, 
and answer their kid’s complaint that he never gets hurt with an “Of course, darling, 
because we never let you do dangerous things”.
11 
Crespo,  Heymann  and  Tohmé  (2009)  distinguish  between  this  weak  version  of 
abduction, which is purely heuristic and only offers a potential explanation, and a strong 
version, Inference to the Best Explanation. In that direction, a way to justify the inference 
is to find positive evidence that makes the argument plausible. We turn to this now. 
 
C. A paradigmatic event that backs Hume’s abductive inference 
  
Peirce uses Kepler’s conjecture that planets follow elliptic paths around the sun, which 
allowed  to  organize  a  huge  amount  of  data  previously  collected,  as  an  example  of 
abduction.  Crespo  et  al.  (2009)  generalize  Peirce’s  example,  pointing  out  how 
information about similar situations, as well as features of the specific case, can be used 
to formulate explanations. 
Unlike Kepler, Hume lacks comprehensive balance of payments data. He also lacks 
macroeconomic  data  on  the  stock  of  money  or  on  nominal  transactions,  making  it 
impossible to test his key prediction, namely, that no country need fear the loss of its 
stock of money, because money is always proportional to nominal transactions. Despite 
                                                 
11 What is needed to discriminate between the two theories is a country with no trade restraints. Smith 
(1776), in Book IV, Chapter III, Part II of the Wealth of Nations, points out that the country that most 
approaches free trade, Holland, indeed derives its great wealth from foreign trade. Mill (1836) notes that a 
crucial experiment on the effect of a restrictive policy upon national wealth is impossible because no two 
nations are equal in every other respect, and adopt the same policy in all other affairs. We try to get around 
this problem econometrically by introducing control variables.   14 
the fact that in his epistemological work Hume states that in matters of fact learning is 
based on repeated experience with a long series of observations that conform to the same 
pattern  and  allow  to  establish  an  empirical  regularity  –Mill’s  specific  experience  or 
induction–, his general argument follows instead the details of one particular historical 
event because no other empirical evidence is at hand: 
  “Can one imagine, that it had ever been possible, by any laws, or even by any 
art or industry, to have kept all the money in Spain, which the galleons have 
brought from the Indies? Or that all commodities could be sold in France for a 
tenth of the price which they would yield on the other side of the Pyrenees, 
without finding their way thither, and draining from their immense treasure?” 
This paragraph comes just after his general argument. In this historical illustration, the 
16
th century price revolution, all the hypothesis of his previous thought experiment are at 
work: there is an exogenous increase in the quantity of money, which is linked to a rise in 
prices (hypothesis iii), so by arbitrage there is a trade deficit (hypothesis ii), that in turn 
leads to an outflow of money (hypothesis i). This case study provides a justification for 
the specie-flow mechanism posited in his explanation. 
As to the actual facts, Hamilton (1935) provides the classic study of how the influx of 
American silver was indeed the main determinant of the price rise in Spain during the 
1540-1600  period.  Inflation  actually  started  around  1520,  before  the  arrival  of  great 
quantities of American silver, something explained by an earlier German and Central 
European silver mining boom; the silver-based price index in Spain rose from 99 to 321 
between  1511-15  and  1596-1600,  continuing  to  slowly  creep  up  to  343  in  1646-50, 
almost a  3.5 fold rise over the whole period (cf. review in Munro 2007).   15 
Munro (2007) stresses that this price revolution was a unique historical experience, 
because while inflation had been frequent in European economic history, this event was 
exceptional both in its persistence over a period of 130 years (ca. 1520 to ca. 1650), and 
in its international character, with price increases that spread all over Europe, and perhaps 
the world. England, for example, had a 6.8 fold price rise between 1511-15 and 1645-50, 
with coinage debasements adding their share. 
Incidentally, the 16
th century price revolution only supports half of Hume’s thought 
experiment, namely, what happens if the stock of money expands tremendously. As to the 
other half, Friedman and Schwartz (1963) provide, in chapter 7 of what Rockoff (2000) 
calls an impressive array of case studies in monetary history, a landmark analysis of a 
crisis where the money supply contracted sharply, the Great Depression.
12 
 
D. Realistic assumptions 
 
The use of empirical observations and historical material is a common thread in Hume’s 
essays. Schabas (2008), p. 167, points out that money is only neutral in the hypothetical 
world of Hume’s thought experiment, because his conceptual objective is to explain the 
behavior of the balance of trade; when Hume (1752) talks ‘Of money’, also published in 
the  Political  Discourses,  the  setting  is  much  closer  to  the  actual  world.  Like  Hume, 
Rotwein (1957), p. cx, points to the abundant historical material in Smith’s Wealth of 
Nations, although Rotwein finds a tendency to abstract from historical influences in the 
theoretical parts. After  Adam Smith, Gide and Rist (1909), pp. 437-438, remark that 
                                                 
12 What Friedman and Schwartz (1963) call the “Great Contraction” is in the context of a convertible paper 
currency.  Eichengreen  (1992)  studies  how  the  limits  the  gold  standard  placed  on  monetary  policy 
contributed to the Great Depression.   16 
political economy suffered from an attack of anemia, since economic analysis, distilled of 
any historical content, concentrated on analyzing the theoretical consequences of a few 
key principles.
13 
In regard to the observational traits in Hume’s theories, Hayek (1963) draws a broader 
consequence,  linking  Hume’s  close  attention  to  history,  and  cultural  evolution,  to  an 
evolutionary tradition within the Enlightenment which recognizes the narrow bounds of 
human understanding, developed most fully by Hume but shared by Smith among others 
–to  which  I  would  prominently  add  Montesquieu.  Hayek  contrasts  this  to  another 
tradition that arrives at truth from explicit premises, rational constructivism, of which 
Bentham is an important example, preceded by Descartes, Leibniz, Bacon, Hobbes and 
Locke in the 17
th century. 
As to explicit premises, following Mills’ insight that we all reason from assumptions, 
the relevant distinction between both traditions might rather be whether they rely or not 
on careful observation to formulate the hypotheses. Indeed, for Akerlof (2005) empirical 
examples allow to develop theories that recreate nature, instead of attempting to impose 
some pre-ordained order on it. Schabas (2008), p. 165, emphasizes Hume’s propensity to 
provide empirical support for his theoretical claims.  In this connection, she mentions 
Hume’s dislike of the physiocrats, though this goes beyond their unrealistic assumptions, 
to their political absolutism. On this, more later. 
                                                 
13  For  instance,  in  Ricardo’s  (1817),  Chapter  VII,  elegant  arithmetical  example  on  the  principles  of 
comparative advantage, Portugal has absolute advantages over England both in the production of wine and 
textiles. England may still gain from trade by specializing in the production of textiles in which it has a 
comparative advantage; international trade basically boils down to barter, though Ricardo goes on to show 
how the specie-flow mechanism will redistribute the stock of money in monetary economies. Smith (1776), 
Book I, Chapter I, does not elaborate on the pure logic, but offers a more realistic illustration: Poland is less 
productive than England in both agriculture and in manufactures, and can only compete in the former 
because of England’s greater superiority in the latter.   17 
The  nature  of  the  assumptions  is  relevant  for  current  controversies  in  economics. 
Friedman’s  (1953)  main  assertion  is  that  theories  must  be  solely  tested  by  their 
predictions.  But  he  adds  that  realistic  assumptions  are  irrelevant,  or  even  the  wrong 
approach to building economic models, a statement that seems at odds with the nature of 
his own work. Mäki (2009) remarks that if assumptions really do not matter, rather than 
attacking  Chamberlin  for  striving  to  use  more  realistic  assumptions  to  build  a 
monopolistic  competition  model,  Friedman  should  appeal  to  the  superior  predictive 
performance of perfect competition models.
14  
For  Akerlof  (2005),  realistic  assumptions  are  important.  As  in  Hume’s  general 
argument, Akerlof’s approach to economic model-building is motivated by an empirical 
problem,  that  hypothesis  testing  in  economics  is  close  to  impossible  because  of  the 
looseness of the connection between theory and the specification of econometric tests. 
Given the difficulty of rejecting any null hypothesis, Akerlof argues for the incorporation 
of detailed information to build hypotheses using “our simple powers of observation”, as 
well as the expertise of the trained economist that allows to connect mere anecdote and 
experience to economic structure. 
By eliminating certain inconsistencies in Friedman (1953), Mäki also finds a realist 
interpretation of that text, linking it to a long tradition in economics that goes back to 
Mill and his contemporaries of viewing models as partial but potentially true descriptions 
of causally significant mechanisms. That view is implicit in Hume’s economics. 
 
E.  Not “Perfect rationality only” 
                                                 
14 Mäki (2009) goes on to say that, in the study of the used car market, it is neither irrelevant nor virtuous to 
ignore that information is asymmetric. On this, see Akerlof (1970).   18 
 
Hume’s narrow bounds of human understanding show in his specie-flow mechanism, 
through  the  process  of  gradual  international  adjustment  to  the  law  of  one  price  (see 
Appendix).
15 This anticipates Cournot. When Cournot (1838) formalizes the assumption 
of  self-interested  individuals  acting  in  markets  as  an  optimization  problem,  that  of 
maximizing profits, and extends it to game theory, as a problem of mutual best responses, 
the equilibrium is not discovered rationally but through trial and error.
16 For instance, a 
monopolist does not know the demand curve, but using the price-elasticity of demand, 
the optimum price can be discovered in a step-wise process by raising or lowering prices. 
Or when describing how agents arrive at a Cournot-Nash equilibrium in a duopoly, this is 
accomplished through a process now called best-response dynamics in evolutionary game 
theory (Gardner 1995, p. 225). 
Most of modern economics has restricted the hypothesis of self-interest through the 
idea of perfect rationality, so economics has mainly become the study of rational choice, 
which Crespo (2009) characterizes as a “discipline-based” conception of economics that 
evolves after Lionel Robbins’ definition of economics appears in 1935 as the study of 
how scarce means are allocated to alternative uses that are valued in themselves. Becker 
(1976) pioneers the application of this economic approach to human behavior. 
Though  incorrect  as  a  description  of  human  behavior,  Myerson  (1999),  p.  1069, 
advances  perfect  rationality  as:  (i)  the  best  analytical  model  available;  (ii)  an 
approximation of behavior in the long run when stakes are high; and (iii) the specific 
                                                 
15 For Samuelson (1980), p. 143, this “is vitiated by the fact that the same good must have the same price 
everywhere in a competitive world without transport costs,” i.e., in Samuelson´s mathematical model. 
16 Just like Hume’s adjustment mechanism, many economists consider Cournot’s (1838) trial and error 
process non-sense. See the literature review in Leonard (1994).   19 
contribution economists can make to social science, by analyzing the behavior of social 
institutions  using  the  Nash  equilibrium  concept  under  the  assumption  that  agents 
maximize  their  welfare.
17  One  must  leave  to  psychologists  the  questions  of  how  to 
improve the education of individuals. 
Others breathe more of life into economics. For example, Akerlof (1984) is against 
restricting the set of assumptions that are appropriate for good economic theory, since 
hypotheses drawn from psychology and social sciences may allow to develop interesting 
theories to explain economic issues. This is part of what Crespo (2009) calls a “field-
based” conception of economics articulated by Coase (1978). 
For Coase (1978), the enduring advantage economists have in relation to other social 
sciences is not in any technique or approach, but rather in an in-depth familiarity with 
their subject matter, the economy. Compared to the rational choice approach, this restricts 
the scope of economics, but it allows to widen the set of things that may be said of the 
economy, a conception that goes back to Smith, Mill and Marshall. 
A fuller analysis of Hume’s views on the narrow bounds of human understanding 
would carry us beyond the thought experiment.
18 What is clear from Hume’s general 
argument is that it relies on an application of the hypothesis of self-interest in a setting of 
voluntary exchanges in markets, so as in Smith (1776) the consequences of self-interest 
depend on a specific institutional setup. More generally, in his essay “That politics may 
                                                 
17 For Myerson (1999), Cournot doesn’t see the implications of game-theoretic analysis for social science 
(see Leonard 1994 for an interesting range of views). The conventional wisdom associates Cournot to 
duopoly,  or  to  firms  that  produce  the  same  consumer  good,  spanning  from  monopoly  to  perfect 
competition,  to  which  Myerson  adds  a  model  where  two  monopolists  produce  complementary  inputs. 
Though Cournot develops the “Nash” concept in concrete applications to industrial organization (IO), he 
mentions an extension to strategic trade policy. And IO spearheaded applied game theory, e.g., Hotelling’s  
duopoly model, since Downs key for the analysis of democracy as a spatial voting model. 
18 Rotwein (1957) has a comprehensive discussion of Hume’s economic psychology and the importance of 
habit and custom in behavior.   20 
be reduced to a science”, Hume (1741) asserts that in political systems subject to checks 
and balances, where institutional constraints provide specific incentives, “So great is the 
force of laws, and of particular forms of government, and so little dependence have they 
on the humours and tempers of men, that consequences almost as general and certain may 
sometimes be deduced from them, as any which the mathematical sciences afford us.” In 
absolute governments, on the other hand, the goodness of the administration depends 
entirely on the “character and conduct of the governors”.
19 Hayek (1967) places Hume’s 
view of rationality, provided by a set of rules that constrain behavior, within a broader 
evolutionary view in which institutions and traditions evolve spontaneously as the result 




Hume’s practice is ahead of his theory of an inductive method in empirical sciences. 
Instead of a long series of repeated experiences that allow to draw a fallible inference, he 
proceeds abductively. Hume joins the quantity theory of money with mercantilist notions 
to develop a powerful theory of the specie-flow mechanism, allowing him to derive, in 
the abstract, a set of necessary conclusions on an empirically contingent issue. 
However, Hume is quite empirical in paying attention to the available facts, grounding 
his economic analysis on a paradigmatic event, the price revolution of the 16
th century, 
                                                 
19 The physiocrats’ political absolutism  separates rational  constructivism  from evolutionary views at a 
deeper level, the narrow bounds of human understanding. The physiocrats defend a strong government in 
hands  of  an  illustrated  despot  in  order  to  swiftly  apply  their  pet  economic  reforms,  dismissing 
Montesquieu’s system of checks and balances, shared by Hume, as conducive to a weak and ineffective 
government (cf. Hirschman 1976, part two). Unlike the physiocrats’ confidence in the ruler’s enlightened 
interest, as co-participant in national prosperity, for Montesquieu (1748) despotism does not guarantee the 
ruler’s best economic interests are served: even virtue needs limits (cf. also Streb and Druck 2007).   21 
which backs (half) his explanation that seeks to address the contemporary fears about a 
wrong balance of trade. This specific case study helps to develop general insights about 
the  workings  of  the  economy.
20  It  is  paradoxical  that  Hume,  one  of  the  greatest 
empiricists in the history of philosophy, has as direct heirs Ricardo and the later classical 
economists,  who  are  criticized  by  the  Historical  School  in  the  19th  century 
Methodenstreit for using abstract deduction instead of induction based on observation 
(Gide and Rist 1909, Book IV, Chapter I). As to economic history itself, Cesarano (2006) 
notes  how  the  move  of  new  economic  historians  away  from  the  analysis  of  specific 
episodes  since  the  1950s  has  reduced  the  role  of  economic  history  in  economic 
theorizing, as regards suggesting new hypothesis and widening research perspectives. 
Hume’s abductive inference is a far cry from inductive methodologies that stress that 
the collection of data and more data is necessary before any progress in social sciences is 
possible. His general argument is a forerunner of our use of economic theory as a box of 
tools. But Hume takes into account the particulars of each problem, something that has 
led some commentators to speak of the inconsistencies of his monetary theory. To build 
good economic theory, one needs to tailor models to the relevant details of each case. 
Getting the assumptions right is, after all, crucial in a discipline like economics where we 
reason abductively. 
 
Appendix: Hume’s specie-flow mechanism in a small open economy 
 
                                                 
20 Hicks (1967) remarks that monetary theory is historical because of its dependence on institutions. Great 
historical events, like the 16
th century price revolution or the Great Depression of 1929, shape it as well.   22 
Hypotheses (i)-(iii) are formalized here as equations (1)-(3). First, the trade balance  NX , 
given by net exports, i.e., exports minus imports, affects the supply of money  M  with a 
one-period lag: 
 
1 - = D t t NX M   (1) 
 
Second, the competitiveness of the domestic economy, which depends on the relation 
between home prices  P  and international prices 
* P , determines the trade balance  NX . 
With a linear constant q > 0, the less competitive a country is, the smaller the net exports: 
 
) (
* P P NX t t - - = q   (2) 
 
Third, money supply equals money demand, which is given by the nominal volume of 
transactions, prices P time real transactions T , and a constant of proportionality k : 
 
T kP M t t =   (3) 
 
A few comments. If the effect of the balance of payment on money in equation (1) 
where simultaneous, instead of lagged, the law of one price would never be violated.
21 In 
equation (2), the assumption is that it is a small open economy that takes international 
                                                 
21 Instantaneous international adjustment helps explain why Adam Smith does not resort to Hume’s specie-
flow  channel.  Humphrey  (1981)  shows  how  Smith  treats  the  economy  as  a  small  open  price-taking 
economy where the law of one price always holds; if there is an excess supply of money, this is instantly 
corrected through direct spending (real balance) effects, as in the monetary approach to the balance of 
payments. Rotwein (1957), pp. lvi-lvii, mentions that Hume acknowledged this possibility to Oswald.   23 
prices 
* P  as given, since Hume ignores the effects of domestic monetary changes on the 
world price level; all prices are quoted in specie, and there is no distinction between 
tradable and non-tradable goods. In equation (3), real domestic transactions  T  and the 
velocity of circulation 1/k  are taken as exogenous, so changes in the domestic money 
stock M  affect prices P .
22 
We can now formalize the thought experiment. Let 
*
0 P P =  , so  T kP M
*
0 = . Let the 
exogenous change in the quantity of money be  1 M D . By equation (3), an exogenous 









By equation (2) this affects the trade balance  NX ; given the lag in equation (1), it 
only  comes  back  to  affect  the  quantity  of  money  through  the  trade  balance  the  next 
period. This leads to the following difference equations for  2 ³ t : 
 












i i t M
kT
P P P M
q
q   (5) 
 
The money stock has the following trajectory for  1 ³ t : 
 
                                                 
22 Rotwein (1957), p. lvi, notes that Hume recognizes that the velocity of circulation may not be a constant, 
for example if people decide to hoard the new specie.    24 
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Convergence  requires  1 ) /( 1 < - kT q ; with  1 ) /( 0 < < kT q , convergence is monotonic. In 
the long run we have gone full circle: prices and the stock of money are back to the initial 
situation, and the trade balance is zero.  
In continuous time, equations (1) and (2) lead to  
 
) (
* P P M t - - = q & ,  (7) 
 
as in Berdell’s (1995) first equation that follows Waterman’s (1988) formulation.  
Differentiation of equation (3) leads to the analogue of difference equation (4), 
 
kT M P / & & = .  (8) 
 
This  formulation  is  a  special  case,  when  adjustment  of  money  demand  to  supply  is 
instantaneous, of Berdell’s (1995) second equation that replicates Waterman (1988). 
After  a  monetary  shock  0 M¢  raises  prices,  equations  (7)  and  (8)  imply  that 
t kT c e P t P
) / ( * ) (
q - + = ,  where  the  constant  depends  on  initial  monetary  conditions, 
] ) / ln[(
* P kT M c o - ¢ = . Stability in continuous time requires  0 > q , and convergence is 
always monotonic. 
Berdell (1995) does not consider the special case of the specie-flow mechanism in “On 
the balance of trade”, where there is instantaneous adjustment of domestic prices, but   25 
rather the case where domestic prices adjust gradually, to combine it with the output and 
employment dynamics in “Of Money”. In “Of money”, Hume focuses on the real effects 
of  money  in  the  intermediate  interval  where  money  increases  stimulate  industry,  and 
money  decreases  depress  it  (Fernández  López  1998,  chapter  13,  describes  Keynes  as 
restricting his analysis in the 1936 General Theory to this Humean short run). Berdell 
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